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BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS- 1961 TENNESSEE SURVEY
KENNETH L ROBERTS*
I. CASES
A. Disregard of Corporate Entity
B. Action in Corporate Name After Revocation of Charter
C. Effect of Merger
1. Privilege Tax
2. Statute of Limitations
D. Judicial Intervention in Internal Corporate Affairs
E. Disregard of Fictitious Corporate Records
F. Criminal Liability of Corporation for Acts of Agents
G. Corporate Venue Under Federal Anti-Trust Laws
II. STATUTES
A. Unincorporated Associations Treated as Corporations
B. Amendments to Securities Law
C. Massachusetts Trust Act
D. Industrial Development Corporation "Projects"
E. Amendments Relating to General Welfare Corporations
F. Miscellany
Tennessee and federal courts decided eight cases during the survey
period' involving principles of corporate law. The 1961 Tennessee
General Assembly enacted numerous statutes relating to business
associations in general.
I. CASEs
A. Disregard of Corporate Entity
It is uniformly stated that a corporation is a separate legal entity
existing apart from its shareholders and officers with distinct rights
and liabilities. It is equally accepted, however, that this doctrine is
based upon convenience and will not be extended to a point sub-
versive of this underlying policy.2 Tennessee cases affirm the first
proposition.3 Conversely, they have disregarded the corporate entity
*Associate, Waller, Davis & Lansden, Nashville; Lecturer in Law, Vander-
bilt University.
1. The writer examined cases published up to September 1, 1961.
2. See generally BALLENTINE, COR'ORATIONS §§ 118-43 (rev. ed. 1946); 1
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §§ 24-48 (rev. ed. 1931); 13 AM. JUR.
Corporations § 7 (1938); Annots., 34 A.L.R. 597 (1925), 1 A.L.R. 610 (1919);
O'Neal, Business Associations-1958 Tennessee Survey, 11 VAND. L. REV. 1183-
85 (1958).
3. E.g., Hinton v. Carney, 194 Tenn. 262, 250 S.W.2d 364 (1952); Haverty
Furniture Co. v. Foust, 174 Tenn. 203, 124 S.W.2d 694 (1939); Parker v.
Bethel Hotel Co., 96 Tenn. 252, 34 S.W. 209 (1896).
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where: (1) "necessary" in order to reach a "just" result;4 (2) it is a
mere subterfuge for the purpose of evading a contract or otherwise
applicable principle of law; 5 (3) it is used to perpetrate a fraud;6
or (4) it is but a "tool," "agency" or "instrumentality" of its con-
trolling shareholders (generally, a parent corporation).7 The cases
are numerous in this area.
Post Sign Co. v. Jemc's, Inc.,8 decided by the eastern section of
the court of appeals, raises the question again, but in unusual
factual circumstances. There, the owners of a drive-in restaurant
offered it to one McAshan, its manager, for $65,000 cash or, al-
ternatively, a $110,000 note secured by deed of trust,9 provided some-
one could be induced to discount the note for $65,000. One Clayton
was so willing, but to meet his individual tax situation the trans-
action was consummated as follows: (a) the owners gave McAshan
an option to purchase for $65,000; (b) simultaneously, McAshan as-
signed this to Clayton, who exercised the option, and leased the
property back to McAshan with an option to purchase for $110,000,
payable in monthly installments; (c) approximately a year later,
McAshan exercised this option and gave Clayton an installment note
and purchase money deed of trust.10 At the same time McAshan
gave Clayton a chattel deed of trust on certain fixtures, equipment
and other personal property in the restaurant which he had previously
4. As by giving effect to a testator's intention, Fidelity Trust Co. v.
Service Laundry Co., 160 Tenn. 57, 22 S.W.2d 6 (1929); Baldwin v. Davidson,
37 Tenn. App. 606, 267 S.W.2d 756 (M.S. 1954); or finding that a sole
shareholder has an insurable interest in corporate property, American Indem.
Co. v. Southern Missionary College, 195 Tenn. 513, 260 S.W.2d 269 (1953); or
determining a brokerage commission on a partnership lease to be payable by
a successor corporation, E. 0. Bailey & Co. v. Union Planters Title Guar.
Co., 33 Tenn. App. 439, 232 S.W.2d 309 (W.S. 1949). See also Thoni Trucking
Co. v. Foster, 243 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1957).
5. Scott v. McReynolds, 36 Tenn. App. 289, 255 S.W.2d 401 (M.S. 1952)
(contract); E. 0. Bailey & Co. v. Union Planters Title Guar. Co., supra note 4.
See also T. Towles & Co. v. Miles, 131 Tenn. 79, 173 S.W. 439 (1915).
6. Dale v. Thomas H. Temple Co., 186 Tenn. 69, 208 S.W.2d 344 (1948).
7. E.g., Dale v. Thomas H. Temple Co., supra note 6; Fidelity Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Guess, 171 Tenn. 205, 101 S.W.2d 694 (1937); Nashville, C. & St.
L. Ry. v. Paris, 166 Tenn. 238, 60 S.W.2d 425 (1933); Dillard & Coffin Co. v.
Richmond Cotton Oil Co., 140 Tenn. 290, 204 S.W. 758 (1918); Madison Trust
Co. v. Stahman, 134 Tenn. 402, 183 S.W. 1012 (1916); T. Towles & Co. v.
Miles, supra note 5; Tennnessee Consol. Coal Co. v. Home Ice & Coal Co., 25
Tenn. App. 316, 156 S.W.2d 454 (M.S. 1941); Commercial Club v. Epperson,
15 Tenn. App. 649 (M.S. 1932); Acuff v. J. Albert Robbins Co., 1 Tenn. App.
708 (E.S. 1926). See also Garrett v. Southern Ry., 173 F. Supp. 915 (E.D.
Tenn. 1959); Roberts, Business Associations-1960 Tennessee Survey, 13
VAND. L. REv. 999, 1004 (1960).
8. 342 S.W.2d 385 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1960).
9. The property was subject to a prior deed of trust for the benefit of a
third party.
10. The transaction was actually consummated between McAshan and
Western Avenue Realty, Inc., a corporation of which Clayton was sole
shareholder, but for convenience of reference only, Western Avenue's cor-
porate entity is disregarded herein.
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acquired from the owners. Shortly thereafter McAshan and his wife
formed Jemc's, Inc., leased the real property to it and conveyed to
it the personalty previously mortgaged to Clayton. The corporation
then operated the restaurant and, apparently, all its creditors dealt
with the corporation and not McAshan personally. In December
1958, McAshan quitclaimed his equity in the real estate to the cor-
poration in return for its note. In January of 1959 a general creditors'
bill was filed against the corporation and a receiver appointed. Clay-
ton ified an intervening petition seeking the turnover of the property
for purposes of foreclosure under his deed of trust. The receiver
resisted, alleging that the difference between $65,000 and the out-
standing balance on the note was usurious since it represented a
forebearance of the principal obligation for a period of years and
exceeded the legal interest rate. The chancellor agreed with the
receiver and held that he was entitled to purge the transaction of the
usury. Upon appeal, the court of appeals, speaking through Special
Judge Worley, reversed and remanded.
The court, applying settled principles, held that the right to raise
usury as a defense is a privilege personal to the debtor, his sureties,
guarantors, heirs, devisees and personal representatives." It reasoned
that any obligation of Jemc's could be purged of usury by the
receiver, its personal representative. Clayton, however, was asserting
no claim against Jemc's; rather, he was seeking to enforce a lien in
rem arising out of the mortgage from McAshan. The court felt
that the chancellor had erroneously ignored this by disregarding
Jemc's separate entity and treating it and McAshan as one and the
same; under the principles mentioned above, there was no good
reason why this should be done. With the exception of the convey-
ance to the corporation of the personalty which had been previously
mortgaged to Clayton (which was explained as "inadvertent error"),
the facts showed that McAshan had "scrupulously maintained" the
corporation's activities and liabilities distinct from his own and, as
noted above, all creditors of the restaurant had dealt with the cor-
poration and not McAshan personally.
The opinion seems logical, well-reasoned and supported by ample
authority. There appears to be no injustice, fraud, illegality, evasion
or subterfuge which would warrant the disregarding of the corpora-
tion's separate entity in order to reach the result urged by the re-
ceiver.12
11. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1617 (1956): "If usurious interest has been
paid, the same may be recovered by action, at the suit of the party from
whom it was taken, or his representative." See also Parker v. Bethel Hotel
Co., supra note 3; Williams v. Boyd, 2 Tenn. App. 111 (W.S. 1926).
12. Cf. McFerrin v. Woods, 62 Tenn. 242 (1873), which holds that partner-
ship rights arising out of a usurious contract cannot be enforced by one
1961 ] 1143
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B. Action in Corporate Name After Revocation of Charter
In Jesse A. Bland Co. v. Knox Concrete Products, Inc., 3 the supreme
court held that a suit could not be brought in the name of a cor-
poration which had had its charter revoked seven years earlier.
The charter of Jesse A. Bland Co., Inc., a Tennessee corporation
wholly owned by Jesse A. Bland, was revoked in 1949 for failure to
pay franchise taxes and file necessary reports.' 4 Subsequently, Bland
leased to the defendant a building, title to which was registered in
the corporation's name. In March, 1956, Bland died intestate. In June
of that year the building was destroyed by fire, allegedly resulting
from the negligence of defendant's employees. An action for damages
was then instituted against the defendant in the name of the cor-
poration. It was dismissed in the circuit court on the ground that the
corporation had no standing to sue. Upon appeal, this finding was
affirmed by the supreme court in an opinion by Chief Justice Prewitt.
The court cited the general rule, followed in Tennessee and else-
where, that after its dissolution a corporation has no capacity to sue
or be sued except as provided by statute.15 The present statutes (and
their predecessors) relating to dissolution and winding-up were dis-
cussed in detail. The present code sections 16 provide for voluntary
dissolution, either by the incorporators (before business is corn-
partner individually. Note that several states now have statutes prohibiting a
corporation from interposing the defense of usury in an action against it,
e.g., Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin and New York. See Annot., 63
A.L.R.2d 924 (1959).
13. 388 S.W.2d 605 (Tenn. 1960).
14. Pursuant to TENN. CODE Amx. § 67-2925 (1956) which provides that a
corporation which fails to duly file or pay the state franchise tax shall have
its name certified to the secretary of state by the commissioner of revenue
and: "Thereupon the charter of such corporation or its domestication in
Tennessee shall stand as automatically revoked .. . ." The charter may be
reinstated upon the payment of the tax within one year after the date of
revocation.
15. See 13 Am. Jur. Corporations § 1354 (1938); Annot., 97 A.L.R. 477
(1935); BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS § 315 (rev. ed. 1946); Pendleton v. Russell,
144 U.S. 640 (1892); Panzer-Hamilton Co. v. Bray, 96 Cal. App. 460, 274 Pac.
769 (Dist. Ct. App. 1929); Dunagan v. Bushey, 152 Tex. 630, 263 S.W.2d 148
(1953). That this represents the general rule in Tennessee see, e.g., State
ex rel. Fisher v. U.S. Grant University, 115 Tenn. 238, 90 S.W. 294 (1905);
Rogersville & Jefferson R.R. v. Kyle, 77 Tenn. 691 (1882); Kyle v. Ewing, 73
Tenn. 580 (1880); Tennessee v. President and Directors of Bank of Tennessee,
64 Tenn. 101 (1875); Hopkins v. Whitesides, 38 Tenn. 31 (1858); White v.
Campbell, 24 Tenn. 38 (1844). A minority of states have taken a contrary
position and allowed a tort action for the recovery or vindication of property
rights to be brought in the name of a corporation involuntarily dissolved,
sometimes many years after the dissolution. See, e.g., John J. Gamalski
Hardware, Inc. v. Baird, 298 Mich. 662, 299 N.W. 757 (1941); Annot., 136
A.L.R. 1160 (1942). However, these seem strictly limited to tort actions
relating to property. See Dawn Constr. Co. v. Davis Home Builders, Inc., 360
Mich. 281, 103 N.W.2d 410 (1960).
16. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-511 to -516 (1956).
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menced) ,17 the stockholders,18 or by the officers and directors.19 Upon
dissolution the corporation continues to exist, so long as necessary, for
the purpose of winding up its affairs.20 Where liquidation is by
officers and directors, they take charge of the company's assets as
trustees and are empowered to bring, in the name of the corporation,
all suits necessary and proper to effect the proper settlement of its
affairs.2 ' The court found that none of these provisions would re-
move the case from the general rule. Three reasons inhere in the
opinion: (1) the above-mentioned statutes relate only to voluntary
dissolutions, not involuntary forfeitures of the charter; (2) even if
they were otherwise applicable, they allow only suits necessarily
and properly relating to the settlement of corporate affairs-which
would certainly not encompass the present suit; and (3) in any
event, suits of the nature permitted must be brought within a
"reasonable" time after dissolution (no time limit being set forth),
and seven years was clearly unreasonable.22 It was concluded that
the suit must be brought, if at all, by Bland's survivors, since, as a
matter of law, all corporate property passed to Bland upon its
termination.
The court seems clearly correct in finding these statutory provisions
inapplicable. Although some of the earlier Tennessee statutes on
this subject were equally applicable to involuntary forfeitures of
charters as to voluntary dissolutions, 23 the present sections apply only
to the latter. Too, an action for damages to property occurring seven
years after the forfeiture of the corporation's charter does not seem
remotely incidental to the winding-up of corporate affairs.24 It is
17. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-511 (1956).
18. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-512 (1956).
19. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-516 (1956).
20. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-514 (1956).
21. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-516 (1956).
22. It is interesting to note that under both the Code of Tennessee §§
1493 to 1497 (1858), and Shannon's Annotated Code of Tennessee §§ 2071
to 2076 (1917), a corporation dissolved, whether voluntarily or involuntarily,
was declared to exist for the period of five years following such dissolution
for the purpose of prosecuting or defending suits against it, and such period
could be extended in the discretion of the chancellor. Annotated Code of
Tennessee § 3757 (1934), omits both the five year and discretionary extension
provisions and contains no reference to involuntary dissolution or forfeiture.
It is in substance similar to the present section 48-516. It seems clear that
all the prior statutes applied only to suits reasonably incident to a winding-
up of corporate affairs. See, e.g., Taylor v. Wolf River Corp., 26 Tenn. App.
94, 167 S.W.2d 1004 (M.S. 1942).
23. See note 22 supra.
24. The court made short work of two arguments by plaintiff: (1) that
under TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-110 (1956) the corporate status could not be
collaterally impeached since the corporation had complied with all statutory
provisions governing its formation; (2) that under TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-711
(1956) defendant was precluded from setting up a lack of legal organization
of the corporation as a defense to the action. Chief Justice Prewitt gave
the obvious answer to these statements-that there sections relate to initial
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difficult to comprehend why the action was brought in the corporate
name.2
C. Effect of Merger
Two decisions, one by the United States Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, raised unusually interesting questions as to the effect of a
corporate merger.
1. Privilege Tax.-Tennessee imposes an annual privilege tax upon
"each person" operating an intrastate telephone business. 26 The tax
is payable in full on August 1 for the year commencing July 1;27
however, the taxpayer may elect to pay in quarterly installments.
28 If
the installment method is elected and the taxpayer subsequently
transfers the business, the transferee is liable only for the quarterly
installments then unpaid.29 However, the statutes also provide that
"any person who first commences business . . ." shall pay the tax
on a monthly basis until the following July 1.30
In General Telephone Co. v. Boyd,31 Southern Continental Tele-
phone Company, a Delaware corporation subject to the above tax,
paid in full for the whole fiscal year 1957 before August 1, 1957.
In October of the same year, pursuant to approval of the Tennessee
Public Service Commission, Southern merged with General Telephone
Company of the Southeast, a Virginia corporation which had not
previously done business in Tennessee, the latter becoming the
surviving corporation.32 After the merger General continued the
business precisely as had Southern previously. It paid no tax for
fiscal year 1957, relying on the fact that Southern had already so paid.
The state taxing authorities concluded that General was a new "per-
son first commencing business" in Tennessee and therefore subject to
the above tax. They conceded that if Southern had paid the tax on
the optional quarterly basis then General would have been liable
only for the remaining quarterly installments under the provision
above referred to;33 they contended, however, that since Southern
organization, not to a situation where a validly organized corporation subse-
quently has its charter revoked.
25. Analogous to the instant case are those cases which hold that foreign
corporations doing an intrastate business in Tennessee without complying
with the filing requirements of TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-901 to -907 (1956)
may not sue or be sued in Tennessee courts. See Roberts, Business Associa-
tions-1960 Tennessee Survey, 13 VAND. L. REV. 999, 1008 (1960).
26. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4102 (item Q) (1956).
27. TENN. CoDEANN. § 67-4317 (1956).
28. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4318 (1956).
29. TENN. CoDEANN. § 67-4319 (1956).
30. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4320 (1956).
31. 343 S.W.2d 872 (Tenn. 1960).
32. All the stock of both Southern and General was owned by General
Telephone Corporation.
33. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4319 (1956), referred to in note 29 supra.
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had paid in full, this provision was inapplicable. The tax was paid
under protest and suit brought to recover it. The chancellor upheld
the tax. Upon appeal, the supreme court speaking through Justice
Burnett, affirmed the chancellor. In essence, the reasoning of the court
was: (1) General is a separate person from Southern and since the tax
falls on each person, General must pay it; (2) to construe the provi-
sion crediting a transferee with quarterly installments paid by a
transferor as being applicable to the situation where the merged com-
pany had paid the whole tax in advance would amount to "judicial
legislation"; (3) that although upon "consolidation" the new corpora-
tion becomes statutorily vested with all of the rights, privileges,
powers, franchises and immunities of the "consolidating" corpora-
tion,34 this alone would not preclude the state from collecting the tax
since its sovereign rights cannot be limited absent a clear expression
of legislative intent.
The tax aspects of this decision are thoroughly discussed elsewhere
in this survey.35 Suffice it to say on this point that the court's deter-
mination that the surviving corporation can take advantage of taxes
paid by the merged corporation only where they were paid on a
quarterly basis seems contrary to legislative intent.36
From the standpoint of corporate law, some criticism must also
be offered. First, the opinion throughout talks in terms of "con-
solidation." It is clear that there was not a union of two corporations
into one new one with the former ceasing to exist, that is, a "con-
solidation"; rather, this was a "merger," or combination of two
corporations whereby one of the constituents survived, absorbing the
other.3 7 The merger statute enacted by the 1955 Tennessee General
Assembly 38 was not mentioned, although in force at the time of the
union of the two corporations. Although this fact alone would make
no significant difference on the controlling legal principles9 the com-
34. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-502 (1956).
35. See Hartman, State and Local Taxation-1961 Tennessee Survey, 14
VAND. L. REV. 1401 (1961).
36. The concluding sentence of TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4319 (1956) (relating
to payment by quarterly installments) provides: "It is hereby declared to
be the legislative intent that only one (1) gross receipt tax be paid on
account of the operation of a business during any one (1) year." Although
this literally applies only to the situation where the transferor pays on the
installment basis, it seems inconceivable that the General Assembly intended
that where the transferor was public spirited enough to pay the whole
amount in full, the transferee should be denied the benefit of a credit for
such amount.
37. See generally 13 Am. JuR. Corporations § 1176 (1938); BALLENTINE,
CORPORATIONS § 292 (rev. ed. 1946); 15 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORTIONS
§§ 7040 to 7199 (rev. ed. 1938).
38. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-517 to -522 (Supp. 1961).
39. The Tennessee statutes relating to consolidation are found in TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 48-501 to -508 (1956). They provide for majority stockholder
approval of an agreement of consolidation entered by the majority of di-
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bination should be correctly categorized.40
Secondly, whether the union be designated as merger or consolida-
tion, it is settled that the new or surviving entity stands in the stead
of its constituents as to both rights and liabilities.41 Concededly,
where the liability sought to be imposed is one for taxes, the cases
show that the new or surviving corporation has had more difficulty
in resisting it (e.g., as where it seeks to rely on a tax exemption
previously afforded one of the constituents).42 But where, as here, a
statute specifically affords the survivor all the privileges and im-
munities enjoyed by the constituents, it seems strained to hold that
rectors and officers of the respective corporations. Following shareholder
approval, the directors and officers then must approve and file the agreement
with the secretary of state and the registrar of the county where the
consolidated corporation is to have its principal office. Dissenting stockholders
are given appraisal rights. When the above formalities are met, section
48-505 provides that the separate existence of the constitutent corporations
ceases and the new corporation has all the "rights, privileges, power,
franchises and immunities . . . " and is "subject to all the liabilities and
duties of each of such corporations so consolidated .... " The new merger
statute (see note 38 supra), section 48-517 provides: "It shall be lawful for
any agreement of two (2) or more corporations to consolidate under the
laws of this state to provide that one (1) of them shall survive as the
consolidated corporation. A consolidation pursuant to such agreement shall
have the effect of a merger of the other corporation or corporations into the
said surviving corporation." Section 48-522 provides that the new statute
is supplemental to the rights and powers of merger which previously existed
under prior law (i.e., the above consolidation provisions). Thus, under the
above provisions, a merger is treated as but another form of consolidation
wherein the surviving corporation was also one of the pre-existing corpora-
tions. Therefore, the effect, in terms of the legal principles applicable to the
new or surviving entity, is the same.
40. The case gives no explanation why Southern and General, both foreign
corporations, chose to "consolidate" pursuant to Tennessee law. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 48-101 (1956) provides: "The provisions [the general corporation
statutes] of chapters 1 to 5 inclusive, of this title ... shall apply to corpora-
tions incorporated or consolidated thereunder . . . and to no other corpora-
tions . . . ." It would seem that at least one of the corporations being
consolidated should be a Tennessee corporation before the Tennessee
corporation laws would be applicable.
41. See BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 289, 294 (rev. ed. 1946); 15 FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 7117 (rev. ed. 1938); First Nat'l Bank v. Harry
E. Chapman Co., 160 Tenn. 72, 22 S.W.2d 245 (1929); Memphis Water Co.
v. Magens & Co., 83 Tenn. 37 (1885); Miller v. Lancaster, 45 Tenn. 514
(1868).
42. It is settled that where one of the constituent corporations is entitled
to a tax exemption, that exemption does not pass to the new or surviving
corporation unless the statute authorizing the merger or consolidation so
indicates; and the statute should be construed in favor of the public and
against the corporation. 13 Am. Jur. Corporations § 1200 (1938); 15 FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 7100 (rev. ed. 1938). There have been several
cases on this point before the United States Supreme Court. The earlier
cases held that a consolidation statute affording the new corporation the"privileges" of the constituent corporations included their tax exemptions.
E.g., Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U.S. 139 (1886). However, later cases
indicated that stronger language, such as "immunities" or "exemptions" must
appear in the statute before the exemption would carry through. E.g.,
Rochester Ry. v. City of Rochester, 205 U.S. 236 (1907); Wright v. Georgia
R.R. & Banking Co., 216 U.S. 420 (1910); Phoenix Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Tennessee, 161 U.S. 174 (1896).
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one of such privileges or immunities is not the right to be relieved
of a second payment of a tax already paid by the predecessor. If
Southern had paid no tax in this case, certainly the state could, and
undoubtedly would, successfully contend that General was liable
therefor. The shoe should fit the other foot as well, despite the fact
that the wearer is the sovereign.
2. Statute of Limitations.-The case of Alexander v. Buckeye Cellu-
lose Corp., recently decided by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,
43
raises this question: Does a merger wherein the surviving corporation
assumes the liabilities and obligations of the merged company operate
to revive a claim outstanding against the latter but previously
barred by the applicable statute of limitations? The court of appeals
held that it did not.
Plaintiff had rendered services to Buckeye Cotton Oil Company in
Florida without receiving payment therefor, but had failed to sue for
recovery within Florida's three-year limitation period. After the
running of the statute, the company merged with the instant de-
fendant (which became the surviving corporation), the merger
agreement providing that the defendant assumed the liabilities and
obligations of the merged company. Plaintiff then sued defendant
in the eastern district of Tennessee, advancing the theory that the
merger agreement constituted a "new promise" reviving the barred
claim. The district court held that the Florida statute of limitations
was applicable and44 that the claim was not revived, and granted
summary judgment for the defendant. Upon appeal, this was affirmed
in an opinion by District Judge Kent.
Judge Kent concluded that while the few cases on point hold that
a merger prior to the running of the statute may operate to start a
new limitation period on the theory of a "new promise, '45 conversely,
where the claim is already barred at the time of the merger, authority
and reason support the position that the claim is not revived by the
merger alone.46 To hold otherwise would deprive the surviving cor-
poration of defenses formerly available to the merged company and
impose upon it liabilities not enforceable against such company.
43. 281 F.2d 187 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 912 (1960).
44. Correctly applying TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-114 (1956) which provides:
"Where the statute of limitations of another state or government has created
a bar to an action upon a cause accruing therein, while the party to be
charged was a resident in such state or such government, the bar is equally
effectual in this state."
45. Anderson v. Calaveras Cent. Mining Corp., 13 Cal. App. 2d 338, 57 P.2d
560 (Dist. Ct. App. 1936); Mitchell v. Liberty Clay Prods. Co., 291 Pa. 282,
139 Atl. 853 (1927); 15 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 7173 (rev. ed.
1938).
46. Board of Comm'rs of Caddo Levee Dist. v. Pure Oil Co., 167 La. 801,
120 So. 373 (1929); 13 AM. JuR. Corporations § 1196 (1931); 15 FLETCHER, supra
note 45, § 7173.
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D. Judicial Intervention in Internal Corporate Affairs
In Roofire Alarm Co. v. Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc.,47 Judge
Darr of the eastern federal district reaffirmed the generally accepted
proposition that courts will not intervene in the internal affairs of
corporations absent a showing of illegality, fraud or corruption. Thus,
he granted a summary judgment to Underwriters' Laboratories in a
suit by a manufacturer whose fire alarm device had been rejected as
inadequate, seeking a declaratory judgment that defendant's stand-
ards were unreasonable and discriminatory. The judge said:
It is not a function of the courts to interfere with the internal workings
of corporations in exercising their discretion within legal limits, and the
establishment of the standards which are here involved is an internal
operation that does not violate any known public policy.48
This also represents the general Tennessee position.
49
E. Disregard of Fictitious Corporate Records
In January 1951, the Kennedy-Herring Hardware Company, owned
and managed by Kennedy, Herring and two others, purportedly es-
tablished a schedule of officers' salaries greatly in excess of those
then being paid and of what the company would be financially able
to pay in the reasonably foreseeable future. The new schedule was
motivated by (1) the anticipation of a "salary freeze" thought to be
imminent because of the Korean War and (2) potential federal tax
deductions thereby made available to the company. The schedule was
recorded in the corporate minutes as being authorized by a directors'
resolution. Kennedy, the president of the corporation, gave an af-
fidavit to auditors of the Internal Revenue Service that such salaries
were legal obligations of the company. However, there was direct
testimony from the officers that such resolutions were never formally
adopted and that all officers knew that the salaries were not to be
paid until the company was able to pay them and until they "wanted
them." The increased salaries were never paid. Subsequent internal
dissension between Kennedy and Herring resulted in the company's
purchasing, at a fair price, all outstanding stock except Kennedy's,
leaving him as sole owner. Herring then sued the company in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee
to recover the difference between the salaries actually received by
47. 188 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1959), aff'd, 284 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1960).
48. Id. at 754.
49. Orman v. Bransford Realty Co., 168 Tenn. 70, 73 S.W.2d 713 (1934);
Knapp v. Supreme Cornmandery, United Order of the Golden Cross of the
World, 121 Tenn. 212, 118 S.W. 390 (1908); Range v. Tennessee Burley
Tobacco Growers Ass'n, 41 Tenn. App. 667, 298 S.W.2d 545 (E.S. 1955);
Hawkins Co. v. East Tennessee & Va. R.R., 1 Shan. 290 (1874).
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him as vice president and the amount accrued on the company's books
according to the above schedule. On these facts, Judge Darr (sitting
without a jury) found that the accrued salaries were "fictitious" and
not legal obligations of the company and rendered judgment for the
company. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in Herring
v. Kennedy-Herring Hardware Co.,5o holding that such findings of
fact were not "clearly erroneous" and therefore could not be set
aside.5 1
Corporate records and minutes, where properly authenticated, are
admissible in evidence to prove corporate acts and proceedings. 52
In fact, it is generally said that they are the "best evidence" of such
proceedings and that the statements contained therein are prima facie
correct and may not be contradicted by parol evidence.53 However,
parol is admissible to show that such records are false, forged or
fictitious, and, when so shown, they are given no evidentiary value un-
less the officers or directors, having knowledge of their false or ficti-
tious character, impart verity to them by neglecting to correct or dis-
avow them and a third person is prejudiced thereby.5 4
F. Criminal Liability of Corporation for Acts of Agents
The case of Continental Baking Co. v. United States55 involved a
prosecution of four bakery companies in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Tennessee for illegally conspiring
to fix prices of their products in the Memphis area in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act. Upon the appeal from a judgment of
conviction rendered by Judge Boyd, most of the questions concerned
principles of evidence. One major issue was the admissibility of cer-
tain intra-company letters and reports of company agents to superiors,
transmitted by an established private reporting system, concerning
activities of competitors in selling goods at lower prices and revealing
attempts by such agents to persuade the competitors to adjust their
price levels to conform to defendants'. The admissibility of these
items turned on whether they could be deemed to be admissions of
the corporate defendants. This in turn depended upon whether the
50. 290 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1961).
51. Relying on FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
52. 20 AM. JuR. Evidence §§ 977-81 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-711
(1956).
53. 13 AM. Jun. Corporations § 170 (1938); 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA COR-
PORATIONS § 2196 (rev. ed. 1952); North Carolina Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Banks,
24 Tenn. App. 660, 148 S.W.2d 54 (M.S. 1940); Allen v. Grand Lodge, 20
Tenn. App. 43, 95 S.W.2d 65 (M.S. 1936); Page v. Knights and Ladies of
America, 61 S.W. 1068 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900).
54. Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 1259 (1956); 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS
§ 2196 (rev. ed. 1952).
55. 281 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1960).
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corporate principal was responsible for the acts of its agents. There
was evidence that the agents had no actual authority to determine
prices and were specifically instructed not to discuss prices with com-
petitors. There was also evidence that the corporate management
knew of the continuing activities of the subordinates of this nature
and did not object thereto. In holding that such letters and reports
would be admissible if the jury found (on retrial) that the agents
had implied authority to so contact competitors, or that their supe-
riors had ratified such acts, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a
well written opinion by Judge Wieck, stated:
There is an officer or agent of a corporation with broad express authority,
generally holding a position of some responsibility, who performs a crimi-
nal act related to the corporate principal's business. Under such cir-
cumstances, the courts have held that so long as the criminal act is
directly related to the performance of the duties which the officer or agent
has the broad authority to perform, the corporate principal is liable for
the criminal act also, and must be deemed to have "authorized" the
criminal act.5 6
Further:
A corporation which employs an agent in a responsible position cannot
say that the man was only "authorized" to act legally and the corporation
will not answer for his violations of law which inure to the corporation's
benefit.57
These propositions now represent established law in Tennessee
and other jurisdictions.
58
G. Corporate Venue Under Federal Anti-Trust Laws
Section 12 of the Clayton Act5 9 provides:
Any suit, action, or proceeding under the anti-trust laws against a
corporation may be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it
56. Id. at 149.
57. Id. at 150.
58. E.g., 13 AM. JUR. Corporations §§ 1132-34 (1938); New York Cent. &
H.R. Ry. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909); United States v. Armour &
Co., 168 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1948); United States v. George F. Fish, Inc., 154
F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1946); C.I.T. Corp. v. United States, 150 F.2d 85 (9th Cir.
1945); Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1945);
Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1943); Mininsohn v. United
States, 101 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1939); Zito v. United States, 64 F.2d 772 (7th
Cir. 1933); State ex rel. Loser v. National Optical Stores Co., 189 Tenn. 433,
225 S.W.2d 263 (1949); Haverty Furniture Co. v. Foust, 174 Tenn. 203, 124
S.W.2d 694 (1939); Love v. Nashville Agricultural & Normal Institute, 146
Tenn. 550, 243 S.W. 304 (1922); Standard Oil Co. v. State, 117 Tenn. 618,
100 S.W. 705 (1907); Turnpike Co. v. State, 96 Tenn. 249, 34 S.W. 4 (1896);
State v. Railroad, 91 Tenn. 445, 19 S.W. 229 (1892); State v. Atchison, 71
Tenn. 729 (1879); Louisville & N.R.R. v. State, 40 Tenn. 523 (1859).
59. 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1958).
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is an inhabitant, but also in a district wherein it may be found or trans-
acts business; and all process in such cases may be served in the district
of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found. (Emphasis
added.)
As to venue generally of suits in the federal courts against cor-
porations, section 1391 (c) of the Judicial Code 60 states:
A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is in-
corporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such
judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation
for venue purposes. (Emphasis added.)
It is now clear that the latter statute does not augment or supple-
ment special venue provisions such as section 12 of the Clayton Act;
that is, if an anti-trust suit is brought against a corporation, venue
must be found under section 12 if at all and may not be expanded by
the general provision.
61
In R. J. Coulter Funeral Home, Inc. v. National Burial Ins. Co.,62
plaintiff sought an injunction and damages under the anti-trust laws
against Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes, Inc., and others in Judge
Darr's court in the eastern federal district. Cosmopolitan was a Ten-
nessee corporation with principal office in Memphis. It had carried on
business in the eastern district until it withdrew therefrom, prior
to the suit. Apparently,63 at the time of suit, it was still fulfilling
previous contractual obligations. Cosmopolitan moved to quash the
summons and dismiss the case against it alleging that it was not an
"inhabitant" of the district, was not "found" and did not "transact
business" therein, and therefore venue was improper under section
12. The motion was denied.
Judge Darr held that "inhabitant" means a permanent resident
and that a corporation is a resident of the state of its incorporation,
and, where the state is divided into two or more districts, then
in the district where it has its official residence or home office. Thus,
Cosmopolitan could not be an inhabitant of the eastern district. He
stated that "for the same reason it could not be 'found' in this dis-
trict .... -64 However, he found that irrespective of whether the
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1958).
61. See Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957)
(patent infringment); Johnson & Johnson v. Picard, 282 F.2d 386 (6th Cir.
1960) (patent infringement); Crawford Transp. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 191
F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Ky. 1961) (anti-trust); Koeppler v. James H. Matthews
& Co., 180 F. Supp. 691 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (anti-trust); Goldlawr, Inc. v.
Shubert, 169 F. Supp. 677 (E.D. Pa. 1958) (anti-trust).
62. 192 F. Supp. 522 (E.D. Tenn. 1960).
63. "Cosmopolitan did a regular business in this district, according to its
own affidavit, until 1959 and according to respondent's affidavit has continued
some business, apparently fulfilling obligations theretofore contracted." Id.
at 523.
64. Id. at 523.
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corporation was or was not carrying on business operations in the
district at the time of suit, if it had been "transacting business" there
at the time the cause of action arose there was a sufficient basis for
venue under section 12. He relied on a statement in United States v.
Scophony Corp. of America:65
A foreign corporation no longer could come to a district, perpetrate there
the injuries outlawed, and then by retreating or even without retreating
to its headquarters defeat or delay the retribution due.
Authority supports the court's definition of "inhabitancy."6 6 How-
ever, the meaning usually ascribed by the courts to the term "found"
is the doing of corporate business to such a substantial extent and in
such a manner that it may be inferred that the corporation is "pres-
ent" in the district. 7 Although this too is a somewhat vague test,
it does not necessarily follow that because a corporation is not an
"inhabitant" of a district it may not be "found" there. A foreign
corporation might carry on sufficient business activities within a
district to be deemed "present" there. In any event, it must be in-
ferred that Cosmopolitan was not carrying on substantial business
operations within the district-at least at the time suit was brought.
The phrase "transact business" causes even more difficulty and
has been the subject of much judicial scrutiny. It is generally held
to be of broader import than the word "found." That is, if the
corporation carries on any substantial business with some degree of
continuity it could be "transacting business" even though not "pres-
ent" in the district.68 Corporations have been held to be transacting
business within a district by maintaining a full-time salesman therein
(sans office);69 by making only occasional visits to maintain good
will;70 by the mere delivery of goods therein for filling of orders ob-
tained outside the district;71 and, by exercising a general control
65. 333 U.S. 795, 808 (1948).
66. E.g., Suttle v. Reich Bros., 333 U.S. 163 (1948); Sperry Products, Inc.
v. Association of American Railroads, 132 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1942); Lawlor v.
National Screen Serv. Corp., 10 F.R.D. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
67. United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, supra note 65; Goldlawr,
Inc. v. Shubert, supra note 61; Hansen Packing Co. v. Armour & Co., 16 F.
Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
68. United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, supra note 65; Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927); Bruner v.
Republic Acceptance Corp., 191 F. Supp. 200 (E.D. Ark. 1961); Wentling v.
Popular Science Publishing Co., 176 F. Supp. 652 (M.D. Pa. 1959); Goldlawr,
Inc. v. Shubert, supra note 61; Banana Distrib., Inc. v. United Fruit Co., 158
F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
69. Adolph Meyer, Inc. v. Florists' Tel. Delivery Ass'n, 16 F. Supp. 783
(S.D.N.Y. 1936).
70. Jeffrey-Nichols Motor Co. v. Hupp Motor Car Corp., 46 F.2d 623 (1st
Cir. 1931); Abrams v. Bendix Home Appliances, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y.
1951).
71. Sunbury Wire Rope Ifg. Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 129 F. Supp. 425
(E.D. Pa. 1955).
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over the distribution of products by independent contractors therein,
even without maintaining an office, place of business or agents.72
As to the proposition that venue may be laid on the basis of
"transacting business" if the corporation transacted business in the
district at the time of the acts complained of though not at the time
of suit, there seems to be a divergence of opinion among the districts.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
reaches the same conclusion as does Judge Darr.7 3 On the other
hand, the court of the southern district of New York feels that
nothing in section 12 "indicates a congressional intent to depart from
the usual temporal reference, i.e., the date the complaint is filed
with the court. '74 Although it is felt that the latter seems the more
logical construction, it must be said that the quotation above from the
Scophony case gives substantial support to the conclusion reached by
Judge Darr.
II. STATUTES
A. Unincorporated Associations Treated as Corporations
Chapter 181 of the Public Acts of the 1961 Tennessee General
Assembly amended the Uniform Partnership Act75 by adding a new
subdivision to the section defining a partnership. 6 It provides that
the provisions of the act do not apply to an association of three or
more persons licensed to practice a profession and/or engage in an
occupation and/or trade for compensation or profit when such as-
sociation is created by written articles of association giving it the
basic characteristics of a corporate entity and upon the proper filing
and recording of such articles. The subdivision then provides that
upon meeting the above prerequisites:
The association so created will be subject to the laws of the State of
Tennessee regulating the practice of the profession, or engaging in the
occupation or trade involved, and such association shall be deemed and
treated at law as a corporation and not a partnership.
The basic characteristics of corporate entities set forth are:
(a) The death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, expulsion
or withdrawal of any member of the association shall not cause its dis-
solution.
72. Don George, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 458 (W.D.
La. 1951).
73. See Ross-Bart Port Theatre, Inc. v. Eagle Lion Films, Inc., 140 F. Supp.
401 (E.D. Va. 1954).
74. Gem Corrugated Box Corp. v. Mead Corp., 189 F. Supp. 584, 586
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
75. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 61-101 to -142 (1956).
76. TENN. CODE ANN. § 61-105 (Supp. 1961).
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(b) The authority to manage the affairs of the association shall be
vested in a board of directors, or an executive board or committee, elected
by the members of the association.
(c) The members of the association shall not be personally liable for
debts of, or claims against the association.
(d) Shares or units of ownership in the association shall be trans-
ferable to qualified nonmembers of the association after first being of-
fered at their fair value to other members of the association and not
accepted.
Thus, the provision enables an association having these characteristics
to obtain the benefits of corporate status without incorporation.
The obvious purpose of this new legislation is to permit persons
who may not associate in corporate form for the purpose of carrying
on their business or profession because of legal or ethical prohibitions
(e.g., doctors and lawyers) 77 to nevertheless obtain federal tax treat-
ment as a corporation under the new "Kintner Regulations"7 8 and
to enjoy benefits otherwise available to corporations.
Section 7701 (a) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code79 defines cor-
porations to include "associations." In United States v. Kintner,80 a
partnership of doctors in Montana formed an association having most
of the aspects of a corporation except that the members were to
remain responsible to third parties for professional negligence or
misconduct. Montana law precluded a corporation from practicing
medicine. The Ninth Circuit held, over the Commissioner's objections,
that the organization was an association, i.e., corporation, under
section 7701 (a) (3). In so holding, it stated that the characterization
77. There is no dissent from the proposition that a corporation cannot
practice one of the learned professions, chiefly because a uniform prereq-
uisite to such practice is the obtainment of a license so to do after the
successful passage of a personal examination relating to knowledge, ability,
and moral qualification. A corporation cannot be so examined and licensed.
See 13 Am. JuR. Corporations § 837 (1938); 41 AM. JuR. Physicians and
Surgeons § 20 (1942); 5 Am. JuR. Attorneys at Law § 25 (1936); Annot.,
73 A.L.R. 1328 (1931); Annot., 105 A.L.R. 1364 (1936); Annot., 157 A.L.R.
282 (1945); State ex tel. Complainant v. Retail Credit Men's Ass'n, 163 Tenn.
450, 43 S.W.2d 918 (1931) (practice of law); Doughty v. Grills, 37 Tenn.
App. 63, 260 S.W.2d 379 (E.S. 1952) (practice of law). See also TENN. CODE
ANN. § 63-605 (1956) ("No person shall practice medicine . . . until such
person shall have obtained . . . a license . . . . "); TENN. CODE ANN. §
29-303 (1956) ("No person shall engage in 'the practice of law' or do 'law
business' . . . unless he shall have been duly licensed therefor . . . nor shall
any association or corporation [so engage] . . . ."). (Emphasis added.)
Further, insofar as lawyers are concerned, the attorney-client relationship is
ethically required to be an individual one. See A.B.A., CANONS OF PROFES-
SIONAL ETHics No. 35 (1933). See 13 VAND. L. REv. 574 (1960) (commenting
upon the case of Bar Ass'n v. Union Planters Title Guar. Co., 326 S.W.2d 767
(Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
78. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1960). So named because enacted as a result
of the case of United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
79. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7701 (a) (3).
80. Note 78 supra.
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of the organization under local law was not controlling in federal
tax matters. The regulations promulgated in the wake of this case
provide in essence that an association will be treated as a corporation
if, after weighing all its characteristics, it more nearly resembles a
corporation than a partnership, trust, or some other form of business
organization. The chief characteristics set forth as leading toward the
affixation of the corporate label are: continuity of life, centralization
of management, limited liability and free transferability of interest.
As noted, it is not necessary that all these factors be present to the
fullest extent. The regulations, contrary to Kintner, provide that
local law shall be determinative as to whether the organization
possesses, or may possess, these characteristics. The new Tennessee
provision, employing language strikingly similar to the above regula-
tions, has met the challenge by substantially setting forth the pre-
scribed characteristics and saying that an association which possesses
them shall be deemed a corporation.
Although this article will not purport to forecast the many prob-
lems that might arise under this new provision, one interesting
question does present itself: could lawyers unite thereunder as an
"association" for the practice of law? It appears doubtful. First, as
noted above, the statute specifically states that the association shall
be subject to other provisions regulating the profession. Section
29-303 of Tennessee Code Annotated 8' provides that "No person shall
engage in 'the practice of law' or do 'law business' . . . unless he shall
have been duly licensed therefor ... nor shall any association or cor-
poration ... ." so engage. Thus the "association" to practice law under
the new statute would apparently be subject to the prior prohibition
that "no association" can so act. (It should be noted that the licensing
provision as to doctors contains no such language.) 82 Secondly, the
concept of "limited liability" set forth in subdivision (3) of the new
provision may be contrary to the ethical concept of the individual
relationship required between lawyer and client.83 Could this cor-
porate characteristic be deleted from the articles leaving sufficient
remaining to result in the corporate designation? Certainly the Kint-
ner Regulations say so. 84 But the Tennessee statute seems to require
all the characteristics to be present before the organization will be
called "association," ergo "corporation.
85
81. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-303 (1956).
82. See note 77 supra.
83. Ibid.
84. See example (1) of subdivision (g), supra note 78.
85. "The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to an association .. .
when created by written articles of association . . . which contain in substance
the following provisions characteristic of corporate entities . . . ." TENN.
CODE ANN. § 61-105 (3) (Supp. 1961). (Emphasis added.) Could "in substance"
mean "less than all"?
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Certain potential tax pitfalls also inhere in the Kintner Regula-
tions. For example: (1) Since income will most generally be de-
rived from the performance of personal service contracts, it could
be considered personal holding company income, and, if not dis-
tributed, taxed as such.8 6 (2) To obtain full benefit of the "associa-
tion" form (e.g., as by the establishment of a pension plan) the
associates must be designated "employees." But can they properly
be so designated? 87 (3) Would the formation of the "association"
(corporation) be the acquisition of a corporation for the purpose of
evasion or avoidance of federal income tax by securing the benefit
of a deduction, credit or allowance not otherwise enjoyable? If so,
then section 269 of the Internal Revenue Code would preclude the
allowance thereof.88
B. Amendments to Securities Law
The Securities Law of 195589 was amended: (a) to include within
the classes exempt from registration the securities of corporations
organized pursuant to the co-operative marketing laws of the state;90
(b) to provide that the financial statements required to be filed as a
part of the application for registration as a dealer might be certified
by "a public accountant licensed by the State of Tennessee" as well
as by an independent certified public accountant.9 '
C. Massachusetts Trust Act
Although apparently heretofore recognized in Tennessee as a
matter of common law,92 the General Assembly in chapter 247 of
the Public Laws of 1961 gave express legislative sanction to the form
of business association known as the Massachusetts Trust.93 As de-
fined by the legislature:
A Massachusetts trust is an unincorporated business association created
86. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 541 to 547.
87. See Treas. Regs. §§ 31.3401(c)-1, 31.3401(d) -1 (c) (1957).
88. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 269.
89. TENN. CODE ANN. 9§ 48-1601 to -1651 (Supp. 1961).
90. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1619(k) (Supp. 1961). The co-operative market-
ing laws are found in §§ 43-1801 to -1849 (1956).
91. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1624(10) (Supp. 1961).
92. Only one Tennessee case was found which used the terms "Massachu-
setts Trust" or "business trust" and it impliedly recognized the existence of
such an association. Bank of Commerce & Trust Co. v. McCabe, 164 Tenn.
591, 51 S.W.2d 850 (1932). The statute taxing income from stocks and bonds
also so recognizes the concept by stating that: "The word 'bond' shall be ...
construed to include all obligations issued by any person, firm, joint-stock
company, business trust or corporation . . . ." TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2601
(1956). (Emphasis added.) And in § 67-2602 the incomes, dividends and
interest taxed are those received from "person, partnership, association, trust
and corporation ... ." (Emphasis added.)
93. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-1801 to -1804 (Supp. 1961).
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at common law by an instrument under which property is held and
managed by trustees for the benefit and profit of such persons as may be
or may become the holders of transferable certificates evidencing bene-
ficial interests in the trust estate, the holders of which certificates are
entitled to the same limitation of personal liability extended to stock-
holders of private corporations. 9 4
The new law goes on to provide that this is a permitted form of
business association in Tennessee; that organization is brought about
by a trust instrument which must be filed with the secretary of state
and recorded in the county in which it has its principal place of busi-
ness and owns real property, much like a corporate charter; that
it shall pay the taxes and fees imposed on corporations; that it
is subject generally to the laws relating to corporations; and that
any person dealing with the trust will be bound by the terms of the
trust instrument and amendments thereto.
D. Industrial Development Corporation "Projects"
The Industrial Development Corporation Act9 5 was expanded by
including within the list of sanctioned "projects" an "office building
for any board of public utilities or any public authority, agency or
instrumentality of the State of Tennessee or the United States of
America . . . .'96 Similarly the purposes of the act were broadened
to include the promotion by such corporations of "governmental" as
well as manufacturing, industrial and commercial enterprises; and
the encouragement of such enterprises to "remain in" as well as
"locate in" the state.
97
E. Amendments Relating to General Welfare Corporations
Numerous changes were made in the laws relating to general
welfare corporations: (a) Associations for community improvement
and industrial development; the exhibition of stock; and other asso-
ciations for the promotion of literature, education, science or art,
bodily or mental health and related associations were added to the
list of organizations which might be granted general welfare
charters.98 (b) Corporations which might amend their charter to
come within the general welfare provisions now include those
organized "for any lawful objects and purposes" (not necessarily
nonprofit). If a private corporation so elects, its shareholders will
receive certificates of membership in exchange for their shares and
94. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1802 (Supp. 1961).
95. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2801 to -2820 (Supp. 1961).
96. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-2801 (Supp. 1961).
97. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-2802 (Supp. 1961).
98. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-1101(4), (5), (12) (Supp. 1961).
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shall not thereafter be entitled to dividends or profits. Charter
amendments must now be approved by the shareholders or members
unanimously, rather than by a majority of the directors.99 (c) The
prohibition against such corporations engaging in a "trading opera-
tion" is clarified so as not to preclude the sale of assets no longer
needed so long as the proceeds therefrom are applied toward the
objects of the corporation's creation.100 (d) The prohibition against
profits and dividends being paid to members would not include the
disbursement of assets upon dissolution, explains a new proviso.101
(e) Each member is now entitled to a certificate setting forth rights,
restrictions, and the extent to which it is redeemable upon dissolution;
such certificates are nontransferable unless otherwise stated in the
charter.102 (f) As to dissolution, it is now provided that in addition to
dissolution by conveyance of property'0 3 or by surrender of charter
after a unanimous vote of the directors,0 4 dissolution may also be ef-
fected by expiration of the charter 0 5 or by surrender thereof after the
vote of two-thirds of the members.1' 6 Surrender upon a vote of the
directors is made expressly inapplicable to the charters of social and
athletic clubs and nonprofit co-operative associations.107 Upon dissolu-
tion the corporation will continue to exist for the purpose of winding
up its affairs and the rights of creditors shall be first satisfied, with
the excess of assets after necessary costs being transferred to another
nonprofit corporation holding a similar charter or to the state or
governmental subdivision thereof for similar use, with this exception
-the members of social and athletic clubs and nonprofit co-operative
associations are entitled to the assets remaining after liabilities after
the payments of claims and costs, to the extent of their contribu-
tions.1os
F. Miscellany
Other enactments in 1961:
1. A proviso was added to the section governing the filing and
recording of certificates of incorporation'0 9 that the secretary of state
shall not accept or record the certificate of any cemetery corporation
unless it shows thereon the certification of the commissioner of
99. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1107 (Supp. 1961).
100. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1109 (Supp. 1961).
101. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1110 (Supp. 1961).
102. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1116 (Supp. 1961).
103. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1120 (1956).
104. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1118 (Supp. 1961).
105. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-1122, -1123 (Supp. 1961).
106. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1124 (Supp. 1961).
107. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-1101(6) (10), -1118 (Supp. 1961).
108. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-1125, -1126 (Supp. 1961).
109. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-109 (1956).
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insurance and banking that the applicants have deposited cash or
bond in a specified amount to insure the proper accumulation of the
improvement fund otherwise required of such corporations. n0
2. The provisions relating to merger of parent and subsidiary
corporations were modified by lowering the percentage of stock
required to be owned by the parent before the provisions could be
utilized from 95% to 90%."'
3. Denominational schools may now be incorporated by an associa-
tion of up to 100 persons and may have that number as directors.
Formerly the limitation in both instances was fifty."
i 2
110. TENN. CODE ANN. § 46-110 (1956).
111. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-518 (Supp. 1961).
112. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-1403, -1410 (Supp. 1961).
